Jordan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948-1983: A Political History by Clinton Bailey

Author:Clinton Bailey [Bailey, Clinton]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, General, Middle East
ISBN: 9780813300474
Google: UTm8AAAAIAAJ
Goodreads: 108710
Publisher: Westview Press
Published: 1984-09-21T00:00:00+00:00

The Road to Rabat

While Jordan was trying to retain its status as the legal sovereign in the West Bank, the PLO was laboring to usurp that status for itself. Whereas Jordan was having difficulty convincing others to let it go to Geneva, the PLO's difficulty was in convincing itself to go. Yasir Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, was inclined to have the organization participate. Not to do so, in his opinion, would be to forfeit the West Bank to Jordan in the event that a settlement was indeed reached with Israel. A refusal to go to Geneva might also alienate the PLO from Egypt, which wished to utilize the peace conference to consolidate the diplomatic advantages gained by the Arabs in the 1973 war. Not to participate would also detract from the effect of a united Arab front.120

Those opposed to PLO participation at Geneva—in particular, the leaders of the PFLP (George Habash), the PFLP-GC (Ahmad Jibril), and the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front (Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali)— argued that PLO acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 would not necessarily negate the Jordanian claims to sovereignty over the West Bank, but instead would legitimate them. Moreover, why should the PLO facilitate a peace settlement that would accord recognition to Israel? What would become of the PLO's entire ideology based on armed struggle? How could the PLO conclude a settlement with Israel and then continue to fight that country?

Arafat sought to assuage the fears of those who rejected PLO participation at Geneva by assuring them that there would be no settlement. The Arabs would demand conditions that Israel could not accept. They would demand the restoration of Palestinian rights, including the right of the refugees to return to their lands. If Israel were to agree to that, half of its population would be displaced and homeless. Also, to ensure the security of the Palestinian Arab state, the Arabs would demand that Israel's "Law of Return" be abolished and that Jewish immigration to Israel be halted. As immigration was the life-blood of Zionism, Israel would have to reject this demand, too.

In any case, Arafat argued, even if a settlement were reached, Israel's return to the pre-June 1967 borders would weaken its morale and military capability to such an extent that no formal guarantees would be able to redeem the country. After that, the Palestinians would be able to demand a return to the borders defined by the UN Partition Plan of November 1947. Even the Soviet Union recognized the legitimacy of the 1947 borders, and would be likely to support the Palestinians' demands to return to them if the PLO went to Geneva.

Arafat also believed that it was possible to draft a PLO position that would not rule out the organization's participation, but would also not affirm the basis of the Geneva Peace Conference—namely, Resolution 242, which called for a halt to belligerency and the recognition of Israel. This assumption was realized in June 1974, when the 12th Palestine National Congress met in Cairo to discuss the very question of the Geneva Conference.

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